Abstract. This work shows that the cryptanalysis of the shrinking generator requires fewer intercepted bits than what indicated by the linear complexity. Indeed, whereas the linear complexity of shrunken sequences is between A ⋅ 2 (S-2) 
Introduction
Stream ciphers are considered nowadays the fastest encryption procedures. Consequently, they are implemented in many practical applications e.g. the algorithms A5 in GSM communications (GSM), the encryption system E0 in Bluetooth specifications (Bluetooth) or the algorithm RC4 (Rivest, 1998) used in SSL, WEP and Microsoft Word and Excel. From a short secret key (known only by the two interested parties) and a public algorithm (the sequence generator), a stream cipher procedure is based on the generation of a long sequence of seemingly random bits. Such a sequence is called the keystream sequence.
For the encryption, the sender computes the bitwise exclusive OR (XOR) operation among the bits of the original message or plaintext and the keystream sequence. The result is the ciphertext to be sent. For the decryption, the receiver generates the same keystream, computes the same bitwise XOR operation between the received ciphertext and the keystream sequence and obtains again the original message.
Most keystream generators are based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) (Golomb, 1982) , which are linear structures characterized by their length (the number of memory cells), their characteristic polynomial (the feedback function) and their initial states (the seed or key of the cryptosystem). If the characteristic polynomial is a primitive polynomial (Lidl and Niederreiter, 1986) , then the LFSRs generate Pseudo-Noise sequences (PN-sequences) with good pseudorandomness properties.
For a survey on primitive LFSRs, PN-sequences and shift equivalences, the interested reader is referred to (Golomb, 1982) . In stream cipher procedures, the PN-sequences are combined by means of nonlinear functions in order to produce keystream sequences for cryptographic application. Combinational generators, nonlinear filters, clock-controlled generators and irregularly decimated generators are just some of the most popular nonlinear sequence generators. All of them produce keystreams with high linear complexity, long period and good statistical properties Fúster-Sabater, 2004) (Fúster-Sabater, 2004) .
Most cryptanalysis on stream ciphers are performed under a known plaintext hypothesis, that is to say, it is assumed that the attacker has direct access to a portion of the keystream sequence (the intercepted sequence). From these intercepted bits, the attacker has to deduce the cryptosystem key. Once the key is known, as the sequence generator is public, the whole keystream sequence can be reconstructed. The complexity of this attack is always compared with that of key exhaustive search and if the former complexity is lesser, the cryptosystem is said to be broken.
This work focuses on a particular kind of stream ciphers based on LFSRs: the class of shrinking generators. They are made out of two LFSRs and an irregular decimation. Shrinking generators have been thoroughly analyzed in several papers such as (Simpson et al, 1998) , (Kanso, 2003) and (Caballero-Gil and Fúster-Sabater, 2006) . Nevertheless, we present a new and efficient cryptanalytic attack requiring much lesser amount of intercepted bits than that of the previous attacks. The basic idea of this cryptanalysis consists in defining the output sequence of a shrinking generator as an interleaved sequence (see (Gong, 1995) and (Jiang et al, 2002) ). The interleaved characteristic of the shrinking generator reveals weaknesses that lead to practical attacks. In addition, we conjecture that these weaknesses can be extended to all interleaved sequence generators with application in cryptography.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the description and characteristics of the shrinking generator is introduced. Interleaved configuration and related results are developed in section 3. A cryptanalytic attack against the shrinking generator that exploits the condition of interleaved sequence is presented in section 4, while the generalization of this technique to other cryptographic interleaved generators appears in section 5. Finally, conclusions in section 6 end the paper.
2
The Shrinking Generator
The so-called Shrinking Generator (SG) is a nonlinear keystream generator composed by two LFSRs (Coppersmith et al, 1993) so that a control register SRS decimates the sequence produced by the other register SRA. S and A denote respectively their corresponding lengths and fulfil that (S, A)= 1 and S<A. P S (x) and P A (x)∈ GF(2) [x] denote their corresponding primitive characteristic polynomials.
The sequence {s i }, produced by SRS, controls the bits of the sequence {a i } produced by SRA which are included in the output shrunken sequence {z j } according to the following rule: If s i =1 then z j =a i , and if s i =0 then a i is discarded.
As different pairs of SRA/SRS initial states can generate the same shrunken sequence, in the sequel we assume, without loss of generality, that the first term of the sequence {s i } equals 1, that is s 0 =1. According to (Coppersmith et al, 1994) , the period of the shrunken sequence is:
, its linear complexity, notated LC, satisfies the following inequality:
, and its characteristic polynomial is of the form:
and p is an integer in the interval 2 (S-2) < p ≤ 2 (S-1) . Moreover, it can be proven (Shparlinski, 2001 ) that the shrunken sequence has also good distributional statistics. Therefore, due to all these good characteristics, this scheme has been traditionally used as keystream sequence generator with application in secret-key cryptography.
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The following result allows us to identify each element of the matrix IC with the corresponding term of the sequence {a i }.
Theorem 3.1
The Interleaved Configuration of the shrunken sequence {z j } can be written in terms of the elements of the sequence {a i } such as follows: Proof. Since the period of the PN-sequence {s i } is (2 S -1), the number of bits with value 1 in a period is exactly 2 S-1 , and all the elements of any column of IC come from the same term s i = 1 of the PN-sequence, the above expression for the matrix IC in terms of the elements of {a i } is obtained.
According to the assumption s 0 = 1, the sub-index o0= 0. Next, the following result analyzes the characteristics of the columns of the matrix IC.
Theorem 3.2
The sequences {d j }= {a k+oj : k= 0, (2
-1) corresponding to the columns of the matrix IC are shifted versions of a unique PN-sequence whose characteristic polynomial is given by:
where N is an integer defined as N= 20 + 2
) is a root of the primitive polynomial P A (x).
Proof. Every sequence {d j } corresponding to the j-th column of IC is a regular decimation of the PN-sequence {a i }. More precisely, such a sequence is obtained by taking one out of (2 S -1) terms in {a i }. The primality between A and S guarantees the primality between (2 A -1) and (2 S -1). Thus, the decimated sequence {d j } is also a PN-sequence. In addition, as every {d j } is obtained from {a i } with a decimation ratio of value (2 S -1), then its characteristic polynomial P D (x) is the polynomial of the cyclotomic coset (2 S -1) in the Galois Field GF(2 A ) generated by the roots of the polynomial P A (x) (Caballero-Gil and Fúster-Sabater, 2006). The starting point of each {d j } is given by the corresponding sub-index oj.
Cryptanalytic Attack
The proposed cryptanalytic attack consists in the computation of the initial states of both registers SRA and SRS. In fact, from some known bits of the shrunken sequence we have to determine the first A bits (a 0 , a 1 , …, a A-1 ) of the sequence {a i } as well as the first S bits (s 0 , s 1 , …, s S-1 ) of the sequence {s i }. This attack can be divided into two different steps. In the first one, the computation of the initial state of SRA is carried out. In the second step and based on the SRA initial state, we determine the corresponding initial state of the register SRS.
SRA Initial State
Previously to the computation of the initial state, the following result is introduced.
Lemma 4.1
Given A bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to A successive elements of any column of IC, the remaining bits of such a column can be determined.
Proof. Theorem 3.2 determines the characteristic polynomial P D (x) of the PNsequence corresponding to every column of IC. Thus, by knowing A successive bits of any column and its characteristic polynomial, the linear recurrence relationship allows us to compute the remaining bits of such a column.
The computation of the SRA initial state is described in the next result.
Theorem 4.2
Given A bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to A successive elements of the first column of IC, the bits of the initial state of the register SRA can be determined.
Proof. Lemma 4.1 shows that the knowledge of A successive elements of the first column of IC allows us to generate the remaining bits of such a column. On the other hand, from Theorem 3.1 we know that the (n + 1)-th element of the first column of IC corresponds to
, that is to say, the (n ⋅ (2 S -1) + 1)-th term of the sequence generated by the register SRA. Consequently, we first solve the following system of modular equations in the unknowns n i )),
and then we compute successively the (n i +1)-th (i= 0, 1, …, (A-1)) elements of the first column of IC in order to obtain a 0 , a 1 , …,a A -1, respectively.
SRS Initial State
The computation of the SRS initial state is described in the next result.
Theorem 4.3
Given A⋅S bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to the top-left corner (A × S) sub-matrix of IC, the bits of the initial state of the register SRS can be determined.
Proof. Firstly, from the knowledge of the (A × S) sub-matrix of IC,
and according to Lemma 4.1, we can deduce the remaining bits of those S columns. Secondly, the relative shifts among columns may be computed from the comparison between consecutive columns. Since the sequence in every column of IC is exactly the same but starting at different points given by a oj , as soon as a relative shift is found, the sub-index oj may be easily computed. In addition, each sub-index oj indicates the position of the (j + 1)-th 1 in the initial state of SRS while the intermediate bits are 0's. Thus, the above procedure can be repeated for j= 1, 2, … till we get oj ≥ (S-1). In this way, the initial state of the register SRS is thoroughly determined.
Illustrative Example
Let us consider a shrinking generator characterized by:
(1) SRA with length A= 5, characteristic polynomial P A (x)= x 5 + x 4 + x 3 + x 2 + 1 and output sequence {a i }.
(2) SRS with length S= 4, characteristic polynomial P S (x)= x 4 + x 3 + 1 and output sequence {s i }. we can launch a cryptanalytic attack against the shrinking generator in order to obtain the initial states of both LFSRs. Table 1 Table 1 ). Therefore, the initial state of the register SRA (1, 0, 0, 1, 1) has been determined.
Computation of the SRS initial state:
According to Theorem 4.3, we compute the relative shifts between consecutive columns in the matrix IC:
-Computation of o1: We know a 1 at the (29+1)-th position of the first column and compute its S-1= 4 successive bits in the column. We compare these 5 bits (0, 0, 1, 1, 0) with the first 5 bits (0, 0, 1, 1, 0) of the second column {d 1 } (see Table 1 ) and find that there is a coincidence, thus o1= 1.
-Computation of o2: We know a 2 at the (27+1)-th position of the {d 0 } and compute its 4 successive bits. We compare these 5 bits (0, 1, 0, 0, 1) with the first 5 bits (1, 0, 0, 1, 0) of the third column {d 2 }. There is no coincidence, thus we analyze the following bit a 3 . We know a 3 at the (25+1)-th position of {d 0 } and compute its 4 successive bits. We compare these 5 bits (1, 0, 0, 1, 0) with the first 5 bits (1, 0, 0, 1, 0) of {d 2 } (see Table 1 ). There is coincidence, thus o 2 = 3. Since o 2 = 3≥ S -1, we have determined the initial state of SRS. In fact, s 0 = 1, o 1 = 1 implies s 1 = 1, o 2 = 3 implies s 2 = 0 and s 3 = 1. Therefore, the SRS initial state is (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 )= (1, 1, 0, 1) . Note that only the knowledge of three columns of the submatrix has been necessary to identify the initial state of SRS. Indeed, this number equals the number of bits 1 in the initial state of the selector register. The maximum number of known bits corresponds to SRS initial state with all bits 1. In the remaining cases, fewer bits are sufficient.
Once the initial states of both register are determined, the whole shrunken sequence that is the keystream sequence can be computed. 
Computational Features of the Attack
The computational complexity of the proposed cryptanalytic attack must be analyzed by distinguishing two different phases: off-line and on-line, each one with its corresponding computational complexity.
Off-line computational complexity: Corresponding to the phase that is to be executed before intercepting sequence. It includes:
• Computation of the characteristic polynomial P D (x) by means of equation (4).
This computation is necessary in order to obtain the linear recurrence relationship for the terms of the PN-sequence.
• On-line computational complexity: Corresponding to the phase that is to be executed after intercepting sequence. Consequently, it can be considered the computational complexity of the proposed attack in practice. According to the previous subsections, the computational method for the computation of the SRS initial state consists in the comparison of series of bits coming from formulated hypothesis and from intercepted bits. The comparison is carried out by means of a few bitwise logical operations on a bounded number of bits, so the worst-case computational complexity is O(A), linear in the length of the SRA.
Finally, after comparing the proposed attack with those found in the literature we get that all of them are exponential in the lengths of the registers. In particular, the complexity of the divide-and-conquer attack proposed in (Simpsom et al, 1998) is O(2 S ). The probabilistic correlation attack described in (Golic and O'Connors, 1995) has a computational complexity of value O(A 2 ⋅ 2 A ). Also the probabilistic correlation attack introduced in (Johansson, 1998) is exponential in A. In contrast with the previous attacks, in this work a deterministic attack has been proposed that improves the complexity of the previous cryptanalytic approaches and that requires only A⋅ S intercepted shrunken bits in order to be launched.
Generalization to Interleaved Sequences
First of all, we introduce the general definition of interleaved sequence (Jiang et al, 2002 ).
Definition 5.1
Let f(x) be a polynomial over GF(q) of degree r and let m be a positive integer. For any sequence {u k } over GF(q), we write k= i⋅ m+ j with (i= 0, 1,…) and (j= 0, ..., m-1) . If every sub-sequence of {u k } defined as {u i⋅m+j } is generated by f(x), then the sequence {u k } is called interleaved sequence over GF(q) of size m associated with the polynomial f(x). }= {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1,  0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0} while by columns the sequence is made out of {u j } (j= 0, 1, 2, 3 ) four shifted versions of the PN-sequence generated by f(x). Interleaved sequences are currently used as keystream sequences with application in cryptography. They can be generated in different ways:
(1) By a LFSR controlled by another LFSR (which may be the same one) e.g. multiplexed sequences (Jennings, 1983) , clock-controlled sequences (Beth and Piper, 1985) , cascaded sequences (Gollmann and Chambers, 1989) , shrinking generator sequences (Coppersmith et al, 1993) , etc.
(2) By one or more than one LFSR and a feed-forward nonlinear function, e.g. Gold-sequence family, Kasami (small and large set) sequence families, GMW sequences, Klapper sequences, No sequences etc. See (Gong, 1995) and the references cited therein.
In brief, a large number of well-known cryptographic sequences are included in the class of interleaved sequences. Next, the link between interleaved sequences and shrunken sequences is expressed in the following result.
Theorem 5.2
Shrunken sequences are interleaved sequences of size 2 (S-1) . Proof. Let {z k } be a shrunken sequence with characteristic polynomial P(x) p where P(x) is an A-degree primitive polynomial and p is an integer in the interval 2 (S-2) < p ≤2 (S-1) . According to the interleaved configuration IC, we may express {z k } in terms of m sequences {z j } where {z j }= {z i⋅m+ j } with i≥ 0, m= 2 (S-1) and (j= 0, ..., m -1). Since by Theorem 3.2 the sequences {z j } are generated by the same characteristic polynomial P D (x), we get that the shrunken sequence {z k } is an interleaved sequence of size 2 (S-1) associated with the polynomial P D (x).
The previous theorem proves that shrunken sequences are interleaved sequences. Moreover, section 4 shows that the knowledge of a number of bits of the shrunken sequence allows us to mount a cryptanalytic attack against the shrinking generator. As many cryptographic sequence generators produce interleaved sequences, then the previous considerations take us into the following conjecture:
Conjecture 5.3 Given a number of known bits corresponding to a top-left corner sub-matrix of the interleaved configuration IC of any interleaved sequence, it is always possible to obtain the whole interleaved sequence.
The confirmation of this conjecture would prove the weakness of interleaved generators for cryptographic purposes.
Conclusions
In this work a new deterministic cryptanalytic attack against the class of shrinking generators has been proposed. The amount of necessary intercepted bits and the on-line computational complexity of such an attack are much lesser than those of other standard cryptanalysis. The basic idea of the proposed attack consists in defining the shrunken sequence as an interleaved sequence, and then using the weaknesses inherent to its interleaved configuration for launching a practical attack. A direct consequence of this result is its possible generalization to other interleaved sequence generators of cryptographic purpose. Therefore, the security of all interleaved generators should be carefully checked.
